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In the News
Last Updated: 01/18/2005Nukes in Iran
International Crisis Group
If Iran goes nuclear, the rest of the world, but the Middle East in particular, will have to live with it. If diplomtaic overtures don't do the trick, is another US invasion in the offing?
The ICG offers us their views.
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP - NEW BRIEFING
Iran: Where Next on the Nuclear Standoff?
Amman/Brussels, 24 November 2004: With Iran's nuclear clock ticking, the U.S. must become engaged in seeking a comprehensive resolution to the crisis that includes addressing legitimate Iranian security concerns.
The latest briefing from the International Crisis Group, Iran: Where Next on the Nuclear Standoff?,* argues for enhanced U.S.-EU coordination and a serious joint offer with U.S. participation. Washington remained on the sidelines of the two reprieves for Iran negotiated in 2003 and again this month by the EU-3 (France, Germany, the UK), acquiescing in the deals but not believing in them.
"The U.S. has good reasons to be sceptical -- Tehran has been playing the EU and IAEA skilfully while acting as if it has something to hide", says Robert Malley, Crisis Group's Director of Middle East and North Africa Program. "But the problem with the U.S. posture is it simply hasn't worked. Four years of threats without tangible incentives to change behaviour have only bolstered hard-liners, increasing the regime's hold on power to its strongest level in a decade".
Crisis Group called the 2003 deal a "crisis deferred", because it did not address the underlying issues. What little has changed since then is mainly for the worse: added mistrust, fewer options available and, critically, less time as the nuclear program goes forward. That deal collapsed, Iran's conservatives strengthened their position, and the country has pursued its nuclear efforts.
Continued U.S. non-engagement would only continue this trend. If Iran is prepared to trade away military ambitions, only the U.S. can give it what it wants in terms of security guarantees and the prospect of normal relations; and if Iran is not prepared to deal, then only the rejection of a good faith U.S. offer will persuade the world to take tougher action. Waiting for a new regime is not realistic: Iran's nuclear clock is ticking at a faster and far more reliable rate than its regime-change clock.
The second Bush administration will need to confront rapidly the issue it so far has studiously avoided. This is what should happen: First, Iran must immediately and unconditionally implement its new agreement with the EU-3, in particular suspending uranium enrichment activities. Once the IAEA has verified Iranian implementation, negotiations on longer term arrangements should begin. For these to have any chance, the U.S. will need to back EU incentives with its own. If Iran rejects a comprehensive, good faith offer, then a plan of graduated sanctions will be needed.
"The optimal solution is diplomatic, and it ought to be given a serious try," says Karim Sadjadpour, Crisis Group's Iran Analyst. "Given the dearth of satisfactory alternatives, failure of this path likely would mean having to learn to live with a nuclear Iran."
Jennifer Leonard (Washington) 1-202-785 1601
To contact Crisis Group media please click here
*Read the report in full on our website: http://www.icg.org
The International Crisis Group (ICG) is an independent, non-profit, multinational organisation, with over 100 staff members on five continents, working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict.
Iran: Where Next on the Nuclear Standoff?
On 15 November 2004, Iran and the EU-3 (France, Germany and the UK) signed a new agreement on the nuclear standoff, with Iran accepting more comprehensive suspension of uranium enrichment, and the Europeans dangling more detailed economic rewards. This will keep the matter from the Security Council for now and, like its predecessor agreement in 2003, is a positive step that could temporarily interrupt nuclear efforts. But at best it is only a prelude to more critical negotiations over long-term arrangements that must include the U.S.
One year ago, Crisis Group (ICG) called the deal between Iran and the Europeans a crisis deferred, because it did not address the underlying issues. What little has changed since then is mainly for the worse: added mistrust, fewer options available and, critically, less time as the nuclear clock ticks. That deal collapsed, Iran's conservatives strengthened their hold, and the country has pursued its nuclear program. It is imperative that the U.S. become engaged in seeking a comprehensive resolution that also meets legitimate Iranian security interests.
Washington stayed on the sidelines, acquiescing in the deal but not believing in it, refusing to table incentives while warning Iran was moving closer to a bomb. It has two assumptions. First, the current regime is determined to develop a nuclear weapon, so the international community ought not to be fooled into a policy of engagement. Secondly, this problem can only be addressed by a new regime in Iran that either abandons the nuclear program or at least renders it far less threatening -- to offer the current regime diplomatic or economic incentives would only strengthen it and delay the necessary change.
There is some reason -- based on track records -- for such scepticism. Tehran plays the EU and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) skilfully while acting as if it has something to hide. De facto violation of its commitment to suspend enrichment activity, production of significant amounts of uranium hexafluoride, and continued work on a heavy water reactor -- among other suspicious activities -- hardly inspires confidence. Leadership in Tehran that pursued different policies on issues such as support for violent groups or opposition to Arab-Israeli peace certainly would alleviate concerns and, given high popular dissatisfaction, eventual political change cannot entirely be ruled out. Finally, EU and other international players such as Russia or China often appear to give political and economic interests precedence over non-proliferation concerns. Still, the U.S. posture is self-defeating, for the following reasons:
Nor has the U.S. offered a realistic alternative to EU-3 policy. Counter-proliferation efforts have mixed prospects at best. Iran's program appears sufficiently advanced as to be immune to sanctions. A pre-emptive U.S. or Israeli strike would carry great risk for uncertain gain.
The U.S. has threatened Iran for four years but offered no tangible incentives to change behaviour. It overestimated the ability of Iran's youth to foment political change, while underestimating the hardliners' capacity for political revival. It vocally pressed for regime change, thus boosting Iran's ambitions for a nuclear deterrent. The second Bush administration will need to confront rapidly the issue it so far has studiously avoided. This is what needs to happen:
Amman/Brussels, 24 November 2004
 ICG Middle East Report N°18, Dealing with Iran's Nuclear Program, 27 October 2003.