Peace and Conflict Monitor

RESEARCH SUMMARY
Border dynamics and the conflict in Colombia: A Case Study of Arauca-Apure and Nariño-Esmeraldas
Oscar Manuel Sánchez Piñeiro
April 01, 2012
Drawing on four years of field research in two of the most conflict-ridden areas, the Colombian Department of Arauca and the Venezuelan State of Apure and the Colombian Department of Nariño and the Ecuadorian Province of Esmeraldas, this paper identifies conflict dynamics in Colombian border areas and their contributions to Colombia’s internal armed conflict. Major activities of armed groups are analysed, and recommendations are made to increase the presence of civil society in these areas for the greater protection of human rights.


Intro: border dynamics in the midst of the conflict

The recently improved diplomatic relations between Colombia and Venezuela and Ecuador have only highlighted the damage caused by the neglect of the borders during the previous administrations.[1] Since the mid-1990s, border areas have been of strategic importance for the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), paramilitary groups, and narco trafficking gangs.[2] Since then, they have used the borders to escape the military pressure of the Colombian Armed Forces, to rest, re-equip, recruit, train, and further diversify their businesses.

The weak civil institutional capacity in the Arauca-Apure and Nariño-Emeraldas cross border regions has allowed the armed groups to take control and advantage of different profit making ventures. In the Arauca-Apure region, armed groups benefit from the contraband of drugs, fuel, arms, food and other goods. Furthermore, the groups have expanded their use and control of territory, illegal mining practices, and the extortion of local business. The border regions provide a mostly free space for cocaine traffic and an entrance point for materials needed for cocaine production. All these activities, which some classify as a war economy, continuously provide resources for the prolongation of the conflict in Colombia.

The military strategy under the Uribe government pushed the conflict into the peripheries of the country, heightening the strategic importance of the borders. One of these strategies was Plan Colombia[3], followed by Plan Patriota.[4] Later on the Plan Nacional de Consolidaci-n (PNC)[5] was introduced, covering 15 intervention zones in 100 different municipalities including the border departments of Nariño, Putumayo, Arauca, and Norte de Santander. [6] These historically neglected regions now faced a diversity of armed actors and weak civil institutional presence, which resulted in a serious humanitarian crisis. Thus, some have argued that borders should be at the centre of our understanding of Colombia’s protracted conflict.[7] Nevertheless, the border situation and its impact on the internal conflict remain ill-researched and existing analyses are limited in scope and mostly impractical as a basis for policy design.

The fieldwork informing this paper took place in the Colombian Department of Arauca, and the Ecuadorian Province of Esmeraldas over the past 4 years, thus this article focuses exclusively on the Arauca-Apure and Nariño-Esmeraldas regions in the context of armed conflict.

The present reflections are intended to bring to light two border dynamics as active contributors to the lingering violence in the region. In the final section, we present some policy alternatives to the current insufficient protection of civilians in these border regions.

Strategies of the irregular armed groups in the border regions

The low state presence and the increased number armed actors have undermined the Rule of Law in Arauca-Apure and Nariño-Esmeraldas. For much of the history of these regions, there was a limited state presence and the state’s approach to counter any structural problems was purely military. According to different news sources, Ecuador has approximately 13,000 soldiers stationed in the border region.[8] For instance, San Lorenzo, a small Ecuadorian border town, has a significant military presence including an infantry battalion.[9] Likewise, the State of Apure in Venezuela is home to a brigade and specialised a battalion to cover the border region.[10] Arauca has over 15,000 soldiers for a population of 250,000.[11] Over the past two years, there was an increase in the number of soldiers in the Department of Nariño (from the previous 6,000) plus the creation of six new battalions and a special police district in Tumaco.[12] The high presence of armed forces contrasts with the low presence of civilian institutions, as the regions Aruaca-Apure and Nariño-Esmerladas have low institutional support, capacity, and competency.

The following non-exhaustive table enumerates characteristics of the irregular armed groups. These characteristics were found and documented in the regions were the field work was conducted.

Activity

Group

Region

Forced displacement (from Colombia to Ecuador and Venezuela, but also within receiving countries)

FARC, ELN, Aguilas Negras, Rastrojos, Fuerzas Bolivarianas de Liberaci-n (FBL), Ecuatorian armed gangs

Nariño-Esmeraldas and Arauca-Apure[13]

Forced Recruitment of Minors

Paramilitary groups, FARC, ELN

Pacific Coast of Nariño and Esmeraldas, Arauca-Apure[14]

Extortion and kidnapping (this includes extortion of business persons and individuals)

FARC, Aguilas Negras, Rastrojos, FBL

Pacific Coast of Nariño and Esmeraldas, Arauca-Apure[15]

Serious violations of international humanitarian law

FARC, ELN

Arauca and Nariño[16]

Human Trafficking

Organised crime[17]

Esmeraldas/Carchi[18]

Drug Trafficking

Aguilas Negras, Rastrojos[19]

Pacific Coast of Nariño and Esmeraldas, Arauca-Apure.[20]

Money laundering

FARC, Cartel de Sinaloa

Emeraldas[21]

Land usurpation

Paramilitary Groups (Aguilas Negras), Rastrojos, ELN.

Esmeraldas-Nariño, Arauca-Apure [22]

Contraband of weapons

FARC, ELN, paramilitary groups

Esmeraldas-Nariño, Arauca Apure[23]

Illegal mining (mainly gold mining)

FARC, paramilitary groups (Aguilas Negras), new groups post demobilisation process (Rastrojos, Urabeños)

Pacific Coast of Nariño and Esmeraldas. State of Bolivar in Venezuela[24]

Contract killing (sicariato)/ Targeted assassinations

Paramilitary groups, FBL, FARC, ELN, Ecuadorian armed gangs

Esmeraldas[25], Arauca-Apure

Contraband of petrol

ELN, FARC, FBL, Ecuatorian armed gangs (los Panezo y los Casquete)

Pacific Coast of Nariño and Esmeraldas[26], Arauca-Apure[27]

Piracy

Organised crime[28]

Esmeraldas[29]

New forms of slavery

Organised crime[30]

Esmeraldas[31]

Description of the irregular armed groups' strategies

The fourteen categories above could be used as part of a taxonomy for the different armed groups and their activities in the border region. Each of the categories will require its own individual study to fully understand their social and economic impact. The next paragraphs analyse some of the key issues as they relate closely to border conflict dynamics.

Forced displacement (from Colombia to Ecuador and Venezuela, and within receiving countries)

Ecuador is the largest recipient of Colombian refugees, which originate mainly from Putumayo, Nariño and Caquetá, as these areas are subject to Colombia's recently invigorated military offensive against the guerrillas, and areas of continuous armed confrontation.[32] About 3,800 asylum seekers live in the Province of Esmeraldas and over 6,000 recognized refugees, which constitute 11% of the total refugees recognized by the Ecuadorian Government. Close to 70% of asylum seekers come from Nariño, especially from the municipality of Tumaco. Nariño itself has displaced over 200,000 persons.[33] According to Socorro Ramirez of the Universidad Nacional de Colombia, border regions receive a disproportionate amount of forcibly displaced persons:

Between 1995 and 2004, 64 of the 79 border municipalities of Colombia expelled 11.69% total displaced population in the country and received 12.25% of the national total. The regions close to Venezuela registered 70.84% of the expulsions and 76.35% of the receptions, the regions close to Ecuador received 20.26% and 26.29% of the expulsions, and border municipalities with Panama, 4.05% of the expulsions and 1.5% of the receptions.[34]

By late 2009, UNHCR reported 1,313 recognised refugees in Venezuela and 14,372 asylum seekers. UNHCR estimates the number of persons in need of international protection in Venezuela at 200,000, but many don’t seek asylum for fear of being identified by the armed groups or because they don’t know this protection might be available. Arauca, on the other hand, has displaced over 69,000 of its citizens from 1997 to 2011 and received over 45,000 during the same time period.

There are also documented cases, albeit limited, of internally displaced persons in Ecuador and Venezuela by the different armed groups operating in these regions.[35]

Forced Recruitment of Minors

The forced recruitment of minors continues to be one of the main reasons for displacement.[36] Although the number of minors in the different irregular armed groups is almost impossible to document, some NGOs estimate the number to be between 11,000 and 14,000.[37] If we just focus on the causalities among the different groups and their continued influence on the ground, we begin to approximate the scale of the problem. Since 2004, according to government data, the FARC has suffered the loss of at least 49,609 of its fighters, including the death of 10,806 rebels in military operations, the capture of 26,648 members between 2003 and 2009, and the demobilization of 11,615 fighters between 2002 and 2009.[38] The post-demobilization groups also experienced a similar impact. According to the Vice-presidency’s Observatory on Human Rights, in the first quarter of 2011, the government captured 800 illegal armed group members, which would add to the 10,400 imprisoned between 2006 and 2010.[39] [40] Given that these groups still have a considerable impact and given the different reports of recruitment, it is clear that the groups are filling their ranks with children.[41] In Arauca-Apure and Nariño-Esmeraldas, children are constantly at risk of being forcibly recruited. During the field work conducted, we encountered Venezuelan and Ecuadorian children as well as Colombian refugees, minors and adults, recruited by the different armed groups.

Extortion and kidnapping

Extortion is one of the most profitable practices of armed groups. Companies that conduct business in their territories are often charged a tax (vacuna),[42] and if they refuse to pay, workers are often kidnapped or the vehicles are burned.[43] In the border areas, the low capacity of law enforcement allows this crime to go unchecked.[44] The law enforcement agencies that are present can be avoided by crossing the borders, a problem compounded by low international collaboration.

Serious violations of international humanitarian law

The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights’ annual report draws special attention to the serious violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) in Colombia. The report finds that borders have a compounding effect on breaches to IHL, and that the lack of civil institutions to document these cases result in total impunity.[45]

Human Trafficking

During the field work we encountered significant human trafficking in the Mariño-Esmeraldas region, mostly involving women who are being sexually exploited, but also other forms of trafficking aimed at labour exploitation.[46] Again the border serves as a safe haven for armed groups and criminal gangs to operate with impunity.

Drug Trafficking

Drug trafficking is perhaps the most lucrative activity and a primary reason why armed groups initially populated Arauca-Apure and Nariño-Esmeralds.[47] Along the Ecuadorian border areas, cocaine is produced in FARC controlled territory and then sold to other groups such as Rastrojos, Urabeños, Cartel del Valle, etc. who in turn sell the cocaine to the Mexican Cartels (Zetas, Cartel de Sinaloa, Golfo).

With the increased control and surveillance and fumigations funded by Plan Colombia, irregular armed groups found alternative routes, often subcontracting or breaking down different components of the drug trafficking business.[48] In Ecuador, the cocaine arrives via Esmeraldas and is mainly transported via ship or improvised submarines.[49] The entry of cocaine into Venezuela happens along the entire border. However, as surveillance has increased, the Arauca-Apure access point has become increasingly important: “since at least 2007, the vast majority of light airplane flights have originated in Venezuela's state of Apure, across the border from Arauca, Colombia.”[50]

Money laundering

The immense profits of the cocaine trade places the illegal armed groups under pressure to justify the funds to tax authorities. The armed groups try to launder the money through legitimate business undertakings: some buy property, some invest in agro-industrial ventures such as African palm oil plantations, and yet others carry out money lending.[51] These practices are particularly evident in Ecuador where a large number of money lending business has proliferated in the last few years, making record profits.[52] Pawn shops are also utilised to justify gold deposits often arriving from illegal mining.

Land usurpation

Land usurpation is a phenomenon widely documented in the Pacific Coast and in Eastern Colombia. There is growing evidence that the same method of extortion, threats, assassination and coercion with the ultimate aim for land seizure is also happening in Esmeraldas. Property held under collective titles belonging to Afro descendents and indigenous communities is illegally obtained and utilised for agro-industrial businesses, oil exploration, or mining.[53] As with other illicit businesses, evidence shows that different actors are involved in this practice and that armed groups are usually subcontracted to pressure communities to sell their land. This often leads to the mass displacement of communities and prolonged disfranchisement.[54] The phenomenon is also happening along the Venezuela border with Arauca, where ELN is buying up large plots of land.[55]

Contraband of weapons

As internal sources of weaponry have been closed off within Colombia, the borders have become more important.[56] Arms trade continues to be a very profitable venture for all groups, including for the regular armed forced of the neighbouring countries.[57]

Illegal mining (mainly gold mining)

FARC, Rastrojos, and other groups operating in the Colombian Pacific Coast and Ecuador[58] either control the territory directly or they control all access to the extraction sites. Besides collecting vacunas, armed actors are known to conduct and invest in their own mining and trading activities. By doing so, the armed actors establish “legal” operations of private businesses or operate in partnership with others. At times, the armed actors supply machinery and transport, as well as a protection.[59] Frequently, the armed groups provide the means for the workers to do the mining who in turn earn a daily wage; if they find gold they are given a bonus.[60] During field work, we spoke to persons who asserted that the stealing of gold in these mines is severely punished. There are also published reports documenting severe human rights abuses committed in mining zones.[61]

The problem has become of concern to the national and local authorities as they seek to contract plots of land to international companies.[62] The increase of control by the state has already caused conformations between gold miners and law enforcement agencies in Ecuador and Colombia.[63]

Contract killing (sicariato)/ Targeted assassinations

In some cases, armed groups also provide services for companies seeking to displace communities from their lands.[64] The homicide rates per 100,000 people confirm that the borders identified in this study are some of the most violent places in the world (Esmeraldas: 53 per 100,000 persons, San Lorenzo: 115 per 100,000 persons[65], Tumaco: 136 per 100,000 persons, Nariño: 30 per 100,000 persons).[66] The figures in Venezuela are not very reliable, but some estimate the figures as high as 67 per 100,000 in the country.[67] In addition, one must take into account that many deaths go unreported and are not investigated.

Contraband of petrol and gas

For many years, people along the Ecuadorian and Venezuelan border have lived off the petrol and gas trade, taking advantage of the sometimes enormous price difference between Colombia and its neighbours. These differences are largely a result of the fuel subsidies that Venezuela and Ecuador provide. The armed groups usually control the whole trade or impose a tariff/vacuna.[68]

Piracy

Along the Colombian and Ecuadorian Pacific Coast, there is an increasing number of cases of piracy at sea.[69] At the time of writing, in early 2012, more than 10 cases of piracy were documented as part of our field work.

New Forms of Slavery

The UN Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of slavery, Gulnara Shahinian, documented cases of labour exploitation, inhuman and degrading treatment, as well as discrimination during her mission to Ecuador in 2010. These human rights violations amount to contemporary forms of slavery and are encountered in particular among the vulnerable Colombian refugees and asylum-seekers, as well as among sectors of the Ecuadorian population, including afro-Ecuadorians, Montubios and indigenous peoples.[70]

Conclusion

The Colombian conflict is not an endogenous matter. The over 45-year long conflict is fuelled, prolonged, and spread by actors operating in the border regions, primarily through the activities discussed above.[71] The borders and the armed actors stimulate what some have called Colombia’s war economy. The armed actors formalize and invest their illicitly gained dividends into the local economy, thereby increasing their control over the local wealth and political affairs.

One might legitimately ask about the usefulness of analysing the different conflict dynamics at the border, given the presence and similar activities conducted by most of these irregular armed groups in most Colombian regions. This is precisely why this paper highlighted the diversity of activities and actors operating with impunity under an institutional void along the borders.

From an academic viewpoint, there remains an acute need to study more profoundly the economic impact of the borders on the Colombian conflict. Through our field work and data analysis we have seen that the Colombian conflict has not only “spilled over” into neighbouring countries, but is fuelling a regionalization of the conflict. In particular, irregular armed groups are extending their presence and control in neighbouring countries. Colombian irregular armed groups have been brought into Ecuador to settle disputes between rivalling criminal families[72] or to train local armed groups, as the case in Venezuela. Today, a multiplicity of loosely connected groups form temporary alliances to profit from different illicit activities, reflecting the economics of opportunity derived from the conflict more than a common political goal.[73]

Policy Recommendations

The policy recommendations presented below build on the proposition that greater institutional support must be part of a broader intervention encompassing human security and greater economic development. The combination of greater Rule of Law and development of opportunities will not only decrease the violence in the border areas but will also cut the legs of Colombia’s war economy.

Decentralisation of the Rule of Law and its institutions.

It is important to restore social cohesion in affected communities through policies designed to ensure access to justice, and the development of public institutions based on inclusion and integration. This must involve an equitable distribution of resources and establishing mechanisms for conflict resolution and dialogue with public entities.

Strengthen Prosecution of Armed Groups

Specialized civil security organs and judicial authorities should be professionalized and equipped to gather evidence on armed groups and their economic associates’ ?nancial strategies and illegal activities, which should lead to effective prosecution.

Increase the presence of Civil Society

Civil society needs to have more presence in the border regions where gross violations are occurring. The documentation and follow-up of cases of human right violations should bring further light into the region. Cross border protection networks should be established to help the victims fleeing the violence.


[1] “La mayor parte de las zonas fronterizas colombianas han permanecido relegadas a la condici-n de periferias de la naci-n, lo que también ha sucedido en los pa'ses vecinos. El caso colombiano se hace más complejo por ser uno de los pa'ses andinos más extensos, con grandes áreas lim'trofes, y por ejercer un menor control territorial sobre ellas”. Informe final de la Misi-n de pol'tica exterior de Colombia, Abril de 2010.

[2] Crisis Group Latin America Reports N°3, Colombia and its Neighbours: The Tentacles of Instability, 8 April 2003; and N°9, Colombia’s Borders: The Weak Link in Uribe’s Security Policy, 23 September 2004.

[3] Plan Colombia era una estrategia que fue eje de las relaciones de Colombia y Estados Unidos en su lucha conjunta contra el narcotráfico y los terroristas y que el Gobierno nacional empez- a ejecutar a partir del 2000 en varias regiones del pa's –algunas de frontera. Este Plan consisti- en una fuerte ofensiva militar y el aumento de las fumigaciones.

[4] A partir del 2002 el Gobierno puso en marcha Plan Patriota para ingresar a aquellas zonas donde la guerrilla de las FARC ten'a su retaguardia estratégica, el mayor control territorial y una presencia hist-rica. Los centros de operaciones de este Plan fueron Cundinamarca, Vichada, Guaviare y, de manera especial, Caquetá y Putumayo.

[5] El PNC se desarrolla en varios municipios de frontera y “se ha venido construyendo en un proceso de planeaci-n conjunta entre entidades civiles, de polic'a y militares del Estado Colombiano”. Es definido como “un proceso … por medio del cual se busca afianzar la articulaci-n de los esfuerzos estatales para garantizar de manera sostenible un ambiente de seguridad y paz que permita el fortalecimiento de las instituciones democráticas, en beneficio del libre ejercicio de los derechos ciudadanos y de la generaci-n de condiciones para su desarrollo humano. Este proceso inicialmente focaliza su intervenci-n en 15 zonas seleccionadas con base en criterios objetivos definidos interinstitucionalmente”. Reporte Ejecutivo del Plan Nacional de Consolidaci-n, Acci-n Social, junio de 2010.

[6] Los 100 municipios pertenecen a los departamentos de Nari-o, Cauca, Valle del Cauca, Choc-, Antioquia, C-rdoba, Bol'var, Sucre, Cesar, La Guajira, Magdalena, Norte de Santander, Arauca, Meta, Caquetá, Putumayo y Tolima. Reporte Ejecutivo del Plan Nacional de Consolidaci-n, Acci-n Social, junio de 2010.

[7] International Crisis Group (ICG), Moving Beyond Easy Wins: Colombia's Borders , 31 October 2011, Latin America Report N°40.

[8] Diario EL COMERCIO, Ecuador desplega nuevos comandos militares en frontera con Colombia. 3, 11, 2011. http://www.elcomercio.com/seguridad/Ecuador-comandos-militares-frontera-Colombia_0_584341584.html, El Universo, Ecuador refuerza presencia armada en la frontera con Colombia, 03, 11, 2011. Revista Vistazo digital; San Lorenzo y Eloy Alfaro en Esmeraldas militarizadoshttp://www.vistazo.com/webpages/pais/?id=15671

[9] Batall-n de Infanter'a de Marina número 12 "San Lorenzo”, http://www.midena.gob.ec/

[10] Approximate figures based on news reports.

[11] Approximate figures based on news reports.

[12] Approximate figures based on news reports.

[13] Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Colombia, Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and the Secretary. (2010 and 2011) A/HRC/16/22 & A/HRC/19/21/Add.3. FLACSO, Desplazamiento Forzado Interno en Ecuador: El caso de la Frontera Norte, diciembre 2010. http://www.flacsoandes.org/web/imagesFTP/1327510754.Informe_Final_Desplazamiento_Frontera_FLACSO.pdf

[14] Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Colombia, Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and the Secretary. (2010 and 2011) A/HRC/16/22 & A/ HRC/19/21/Add.3. Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Estudio Nacional Exploratorio Descriptivo sobre el Fen-meno de Trata de Personas en Colombia, febrero 2009. http://www.unodc.org/documents/frontpage/Investigacion_Trata_CO1.pdf Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Child Soldiers Global Report 2008 - Venezuela, 20 May 2008, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/486cb13d2d.htm.

[15] Vicepresidencia de la República Observatorio del Programa Presidencial de Derechos Humanos y DIH, Vicepresidencia de la República. Programa Actual Arauca y Casanare, Bogotá, junio, 2002. ISSN 1657-818 X Serie Geográfica No. 13. VenEconom'a Mensual , Guerras fronterizas: FBL contra el ELN, Octubre de 2004. http://www.veneconomy.com/site/files/articulos/artEsp4022_2819.pdf

[16] Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Colombia, Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and the Secretary. (2010 and 2011) A/HRC/16/22 & A/HRC/19/21/Add.3.

[17] Organised crime acting on behalf or under the immediate control or acquiesces of the groups controlling the region. See. Reyes, A., Thoumi, F., y Duica L., El narcotráfico en las relaciones fronterizas de Colombia, (2006). Bogotá: Centro de Estudios y Observatorio de Drogas y Delito de la Universidad del Rosario / Direcci-n Nacional de Estupefacientes del Ministerio del Interior y de Justicia. Recuperado el 3 de enero de 2008 de http://www.urosario.edu.co/FASE1/economia/CEODD/docs/DNE_informe_definitivo.pdf

[18] Multiple Press notes: http://www.eluniverso.com/2009/05/22/1/1447/7BC58770DC954BAB92AB98E62F09C79F.html,Diana Alejandra Rojas Moreno, Colombia no solo exporta café, también exporta putas”: Migracion internacional y trabajo sexual, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Facultad de Ciencias Humanas, Escuela de Estudios de Género, Bogotá, Colombia 2011. Universidead Nacional de Colombia, Estudio Nacional Exploratorio Descriptivo sobre la Trata de Personas en Colombia, febrero 2009.

[19] El Universal, Ecuado, punto de contacto de cartels mexicanos, 1/04/2012 http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/833551.html and Detienen a Comandante de Policia de Esmeraldas que estira vinculado con cartel mexicano de droga, 28/09/2011. VenEconom'a Mensual , Guerras fronterizas: FBL contra el ELN, Octubre de 2004. http://www.veneconomy.com/site/files/articulos/artEsp4022_2819.pdf

[20] International Crisis Group (ICG), La Droga en America Latina I: Perdiendo la Lucha, Informe sobre América Latina N°25 –14 de marzo de 2008. “Comunicado de los obispos de la frontera colombo-ecuatoriana”, de los Obispos de Ipiales, Tumaco, Puerto Legu'zamo (Colombia) y los de Esmeraldas, Sucumb'os e Ibarra (Ecuador), 28 abril de 2010

[21] http://www.elcomercio.com/seguridad/DEA-siguio-operativo-supuesto-Esmeraldas_0_637736392.html, http://www.elcomercio.com/seguridad/Doble-crimen-enlazaria-muerte-Pintag_0_499150234.html

[22] Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Colombia, Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and the Secretary. (2010 and 2011) A/HRC/16/22 & A/HRC/19/21/Add.3. Sebastian Ocampo, Agroinsutria y Conflicto armado. El caso de la palma de aciete. Colombia Internacional, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales Departamento de Ciencia Pol'tica Junio-Diciembre 2009. ISSN (versi-n en l'nea): 1900-6004. Roque Roldán, Importancia de los territorios colectivos de ind'genas y afroamericanos en el desarrollo rural.Revista Futuros, Capitulo 6.http://www.revistafuturos.info/download/down11/RR_desterritorialrural.pdf. FLACSO, Desplazamiento Forzado Interno en Ecuador: El caso de la Frontera Norte,diciembre 2010. Preliminary Observations of the Inter-American Commission on human Rights after the Visit of the Rapporteurship on the Rights of Afro-descendants and Against Racial Discrimination to the Republic of Colombia. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.134 Doc. 66, 27 March 2009. Movimiento Mundial por los Bosques Tropicales, El amargo fruto de la palma aceitera:despojo y deforestaci-n. agosto 2001. http://www.wrm.org.uy/plantaciones/material/amargo_fruto.pdf

[23] Revista Arcanos, El conflicto colombiano. Expansi-n de sus protagonistas hacia las fronteras, Coporacion Arco Iris. 7 Jun 2004. VenEconom'a Mensual , Guerras fronterizas: FBL contra el ELN, Octubre de 2004. http://www.veneconomy.com/site/files/articulos/artEsp4022_2819.pdf

[24] Multiple newspaper articles report on this trend, following are some links: http://feeds.univision.com/feeds/article/2012-01-12/detienen-7-colombianos-presuntamente-vinculados, http://radioequinoccio.com/inicio/item/2608-colombia-y-ecuador-investigaran-si-mineria-ilegal-financia-terrorismo.html, http://www.abc.com.py/nota/capturan-a-siete-colombianos-por-choque-armado-en-mina-de-oro-ilegal/, http://www.elpais.com.co/elpais/colombia/noticias/gobiernos-colombia-y-ecuador-frente-contra-mineria-ilegal

[25] Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Colombia, Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and the Secretary. (2010 and 2011) A/HRC/16/22 & A/HRC/19/21/Add.3. Press notes: http://www.elcomercio.com/seguridad/Ecuador-dio-duro-golpe-narcotrafico_0_619138087.html. VenEconom'a Mensual , Guerras fronterizas: FBL contra el ELN, Octubre de 2004. http://www.veneconomy.com/site/files/articulos/artEsp4022_2819.pdf

[26] http://www.hoy.com.ec/noticias-ecuador/la-violencia-crece-al-norte-de-la-provincia-de-esmeraldas-316997.html

[27] VenEconom'a Mensual , Guerras fronterizas: FBL contra el ELN, Octubre de 2004. http://www.veneconomy.com/site/files/articulos/artEsp4022_2819.pdf

[28] Organised crime acting on behalf or under the immediate control or acquiesces of the groups controlling the region.

[29]http://www.elcomercio.com/agromar/pescadores-piden-mejor-patrullaje_0_521947956.html

[30] Organised crime acting on behalf or under the immediate control or acquiesces of the groups controlling the region.

[31] Report of the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of slavery, including its causes and consequences, Gulnara Shahinia.Field Visit to Ecuador. 5 July 2010. A/HRC/15/20/Add.3.

[32] Data from the Refugee Directorate December 2011.

[33] Registro Acumulado con corte a Noviembre 30 de 2011 Poblaci-n Desplazada / Acci-n Social

[34] Socorro Ram'rez, La ambigua regionalizaci-n del conflicto colombiano. En F. Gutiérrez,

Sánchez et al., Nuestra guerra sin nombre. Transformaciones del conflicto en Colombia, (pp. 121-166). (2006).Bogotá: IEPRI/ Norma

[35] FLACSO, Desplazamiento Forzado Interno en Ecuador: El caso de la Frontera Norte, diciembre 2010. Field interviews conducted in the State of Apure in 2010-2011.

[36] SIPOD, Acci-n Social, www.accionsocial.gov.co

[37] Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict, Colombia`s War on Children, February 2004.

[38] International Crisis Group. “Poner fin al conflicto con las Farc en Colombia: Jugar la carta correcta. 26 de marzo de 2009.

[39] ttp://www.elcolombiano.com/BancoConocimiento/N/bacrim_una_amenaza_y_que_contenerlas_dice_naranajo.asp?pag=2&todos=1

[40] Analysis taken from an upcoming report on Forced Recruitment by A. Celis and L. Nieto.

[41] Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Colombia, Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and the Secretary. (2010 and 2011) A/HRC/16/22 & A/ HRC/19/21/Add.3

[42] Ariel Fernando Ávila, Contexto de violencia y conflicto armado. Monograf'a pol'tico electoral Departamento de Casanare 1997 a 2007. Observatorio de Democracia de la Misi-n de Observaci-n Electoral, Edici-n de L-pez, Bogota, 2010

[43] http://www.lavozdelcinaruco.com/?id=6417

[44] Direcci-n Operativa para la Defensa de la Libertad Personal, Programa Presidencial para la Defensa de la Libertad personal, http://www.antisecuestro.gov.co/web/. Ministerio de Defensa Nacional República de Colombia, Informe del Ministro al Congreso, Julio, 2011. http://www.mindefensa.gov.co/irj/go/km/docs/Mindefensa/Documentos/descargas/Prensa/Documentos/memorias2010-2011.pdf. http://www.elsecuestro.com/listado.php?sort=nombre

[45] Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Colombia, Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and the Secretary. (2010 and 2011) A/HRC/16/22 & A/HRC/19/21/Add.3

[46] UNODC and the UN Global Initiative to fight Human Trafficking, Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2009, published a first global report on human trafficking in February 2009. http://m.eltiempo.com/colombia/red-de-trata-de-personas-acosa-a-mujeres-en-frontera-con-ecuador/7085427

[47] “A study of the Joint Intelligence Board on the finances of the FARC, with data for 2003 estimated that 97% of revenues guerrilla group come from drug tracking (45.8%), extortion (41.31%) and abduction (9.89%). Also significant income came from theft of fuel, cattle rustling, the capture of state revenues (royalties, transfers, contracts) through armed clientelism and profitability of investment portfolios real sector. To get an idea of the magnitude of these businesses, according to estimates, in that year (2003) the FARC earned 1 bill-n 337 mil millones de pesos. Hechos del Callejon, PNUD, A-o 2, Febrero de 2006 ISSN 1794-9408. Reyes, A., Thoumi, F., y Duica L., El narcotráfico en las relaciones fronterizas de Colombia, (2006). Bogotá: Centro de Estudios y Observatorio de Drogas y Delito de la Universidad del Rosario / Direcci-n Nacional de Estupefacientes del Ministerio del Interior y de Justicia. Recuperado el 3 de enero de 2008 de http://www.urosario.edu.co/FASE1/economia/CEODD/docs/DNE_informe_definitivo.pdf

[48] Maps by US Southern Command on Drug Trafiffcing routes: http://justf.org/taxonomy/term/51

[49] http://www.newser.com/story/94647/ecuador-dea-bust-drug-smuggling-sub.html. http://www.sisepuedeecuador.com/noticias/nacionales/6475-capturan-submarino-a-narcotraficantes.html

[50] http://justf.org/taxonomy/term/51, http://www.google.com.ec/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=4&cts=1331487805190&ved=0CDoQFjAD&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.wilsoncenter.org%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2FSanju%2525C3%2525A1n1.ppt&ei=uuNcT5SlJMTLsQLfxeWtDQ&usg=AFQjCNGx1tJ26ye6jMh2K2JsmSYw6DUPcA, http://www.notitarde.com/notitarde/plantillas/notitarde/inota.aspx?idart=1570593&idcat=9841&tipo=2

[51] Mar'a Teresa Ronderos, “Fiebre minera se apoder- de Colombia,” Semana, 6 September 2011. http://www.semana.com/nacion/fiebre-mineraapodero-colombia/163716-3.aspx. http://www.eluniverso.com/2011/06/12/1/1422/desde-2008-red-ha-lavado-37-millones-dolares-ecuador.html

[52] http://www.ecuavisa.com/noticias/noticias-actualidad/45388-red-de-casas-de-empeno-desarticulada-en-esmeraldas-opera-en-todo-el-pais.html . http://www.hoy.com.ec/noticias-ecuador/las-investigaciones-de-narcotrafico-tienen-tres-responsables-en-la-policia-334135.html

[53] United Nations Development Programme,“National Human Development Report 2011: rural Colombia, reasons for hope,” September 2011. Comisi-n Colombiana de Jurista, Despojo de tierras campesinas y vulneraci-n de los territorios ancestrales, junio 2011. Bogotá D.C., Colombia. ISBN: 978-958-9348-51-2. Auto 004/09, Corte Constitucional Colombiana, Bogotá, D.C., veintiséis (26) de enero de dos mil nueve (2009). http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/autos/2009/a004-09.htm http://www.semana.com/documents/Doc-1894_2009619.pdf

[54] Área de Memoria Hist-rica Comisi-n Nacional de Reparaci-n y Reconciliaci-n L'nea de Investigaci-n Tierra y Conflicto, El Despojo de Tierras y Territorios. Aproximaci-n conceptual, Bogotá, Julio 2009

[55] La Voz del Cinaruco, Habitantes de estado venezolano fronterizo marchan para denunciar incursi-n del ELN, Actualizado 2011-10-14.

[56] UNODC, Violencia, Crimen y Trafico Ilegal de Armas en Colombia, http://www.unodc.org/documents/southerncone//Topics_crime/Publicacoes/Violencia20crimen20y20trafico20ilegal20de20armas20en20Colombia20-20420de20Diciembre202006.pdf, Tensi-n en la Fronteras. Un analisis el conflcito armado, el desplazamiento forzado y el refugio en las fronteras de Colombia con Ecuado, Venezuela y Panamà, Bogota, Julio 2009. http://www.codhes.org/index2.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_view&gid=120&Itemid=50 http://www.saber.ula.ve/bitstream/123456789/18245/2/articulo8.pdf. http://www.ecuadorinmediato.com/index.php?module=Noticias&func=news_user_view&id=168300&umt=policia_judicial_incauta_44_500_municiones_destinadas_a_grupos_irregulares_colombia

[57] J. Aristizábal, Guerra, Estado y globalizaci-n en Colombia, (2007). Bogotá: Desde Abajo

[58] Juan Camilo Martin Clav'jo, Mal de muchos: crecimiento econ-mico en medio de la guerra, La Silla Vac'a, 15 June 2011, http://www.lasillavacia.com/historia-invitado/24523/juan-clamar/mal-de-muchos-crecimientoeconomico-en-medio-de-la-guerra

[59] El Comercio, Los Rastrojos desplazan a las FARC en la frontera, 05/10/11. US Department of Justics, The Drug Enforcement Administration´s Intrnal Operations Audit report 2007, http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/DEA/a0719/final.pdf.Jaime D'az, El oro estriste, Observatorio pac'fico y territorio, 7 October 2011, http://www.pacificocolombia.org/novedades/triste/524

[60] PBI Colombia, Guamoc-: Rich in gold, poor in defending human rights, ColomPBIa, no.9, November 2008.

[61] SINTRAMINERCOL, “La violaci-n de los derechos humanos en el pa's está estrechamente ligada con el modelo econ-mico existente en Colombia,” www.acantioquia.org/...foro/EXPOSIC_SINTRAMINERCOL.doc

[62] PBI Colombia, Mining legislation: Advancements and setbacks, and Before this country was even a republic there was mining in Colombia. Newsletter no 18. November 2011. http://www.pbi-colombia.org/fileadmin/user_files/projects/colombia/files/colomPBIa/111203_mining_in_colombia_web.pdf

[63] http://www.hoy.com.ec/noticias-ecuador/operativo-en-areas-mineras-ilegales-ayer-en-esmeraldas-476589.html. https://mail.google.com/mail/#search/Mineria+++rastrojos/135355ea20986e5e

[64] . Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, “La Responsabilidad Empresarial y los Derechos Humanos,” October 2009; More information in: “Chiquita Brands International y los paramilitares en Colombia,” Noti Mundo, 28 July 2008. ttp://midar.wordpress.com/2008/07/28/chiquita-brands-international-y-losparamilitares-en-colombia/. Press note: Ochenta empresas financiaban a paramilitares del Bloque Norte: Asi lo denuncio el ex militante, alias don Antonio, El Espectador, 3 February 2010,Francisco Ram'rez, Impactos ambientales y socioecon-micos de la miner'a: Gran miner'a en Colombia, ¿Para qué y para quién” Grupo Semillas, No. 42/43, 24 November 2010, http://www.semillas.org.co/sitio.shtml?apc=w--1--&x=20157371

[65] http://www.elcomercio.com/seguridad/homicidos-asesinatos-ecuador-2011_ECMFIL20120222_0001.pdf

[66] Instituto de Medicina Legal y Ciencias Forenses, Descripci-n del Comportamiento del Homicidio, Colombia, 2010. http://www.medicinalegal.gov.co/images/stories/root/FORENSIS/2010/HOMICIDIO.pdf

[67] http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/United-Nations-Surveys-on-Crime-Trends-and-the-Operations-of-Criminal-Justice-Systems.html

[68] United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Office in Colombia, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Human Rights Situation in Colombia. Presented to the United Nations Commission for Human Rights, February 24, 2003. UN Document E/CN.4/2003/13. Page 14. Available on the web at www.hchr.org.co

[69] http://www.lahora.com.ec/index.php/noticias/show/1101261938/-1/Cuatro%20lanchas%20para%20enfrentar%20a%20la%20pirater%C3%ADa.html

[70] Report of the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of slavery, including its causes and consequences, Gulnara Shahinian, Mission to Ecuador. 5 July 2010. A/HRC/15/20/Add.3

[71] Socorro Ram'rez, La ambigua regionalizacion del conflicto colombiano. En F. Gutiérrez, Sánchez et al., Nuestra guerra sin nombre. (2006). Transformaciones del conflicto en Colombia (pp. 121-166). Bogotá: IEPRI/ Norma.

[72] http://www.hoy.com.ec/noticias-ecuador/la-violencia-crece-al-norte-de-la-provincia-de-esmeraldas-316997.html

[73] lvia Cristina Mantilla Valbuena, Hacia una perspectiva “glocal” del Conflicto en Colombia. Revista Javariana.s. http://revistas.javeriana.edu.co/sitio/papelpolitico/admin/upload/uploads/9.%20Silvia%20Mantilla.pdf


Oscar Manuel Sánchez Piñeiro is a humanitarian worker with more than 10 years of experience in the field. For the past 4 years has worked in the Colombia and Ecuador. Special thanks to Petra Heusser for her review and comments to the first draft of this article. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.